1. With
reference to Christ's words on the subject of marriage, in which he
appealed to the "beginning," we directed our attention last week to
the first account of man's creation in the first chapter of Genesis.
Today we shall pass to the second account, which is frequently
described as the "Yahwist," since it uses the name "Yahweh" for God.
The
second account of man's creation (linked to the presentation both of
original innocence and happiness and of the first fall) has by its
nature a different character. While not wishing to anticipate the
particulars of this narrative—because it will be better for us to
recall them in later analyses—we should note that the entire text,
in formulating the truth about man, amazes us with its typical
profundity, different from that of the first chapter of Genesis.
Ancient description
It can
be said that it is a profundity that is of a nature particularly
subjective, and therefore, in a certain sense, psychological. The
second chapter of Genesis constitutes, in a certain manner, the most
ancient description and record of man's self-knowledge. Together
with the third chapter it is the first testimony of human
conscience. A reflection in depth on this text—through the whole
archaic form of the narrative, which manifests its primitive
mythical character(1)—provides us in nucleo with nearly all the
elements of the analysis of man, to which modern, and especially
contemporary philosophical anthropology is sensitive. It could be
said that Genesis 2 presents the creation of man especially in its
subjective aspect. Comparing both accounts, we conclude that this
subjectivity corresponds to the objective reality of man created "in
the image of God." This fact also is—in another way—important for
the theology of the body, as we shall see in subsequent analyses.
First
human being
2. It is
significant that in his reply to the Pharisees, in which he appealed
to the "beginning," Christ indicated first of all the creation of
man by referring to Genesis 1:27: "The Creator from the beginning
created them male and female." Only afterward did he quote the text
of Genesis 2:24. The words which directly describe the unity and
indissolubility of marriage are found in the immediate context of
the second account of creation. Its characteristic feature is the
separate creation of woman (cf. Gn 2:18-23), while the account of
the creation of the first man is found in Genesis 2:5-7.
The
Bible calls the first human being "man" ('adam), but from the moment
of the creation of the first woman, it begins to call him "man" (ish),
in relation to ishshah ("woman," because she was taken from the man—ish).(2)
It is
also significant that in referring to Genesis 2:24, Christ not only
linked the "beginning" with the mystery of creation, but also led
us, one might say, to the limit of man's primitive innocence and of
original sin. Genesis places the second description of man's
creation precisely in this context. There we read first of all: "And
the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man he made into a
woman and brought her to the man; then the man said: 'This at last
is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called
woman, because she was taken out of man'" (Gn 2:22-23). "Therefore a
man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and
they become one flesh" (Gn 2:24). "And the man and his wife were
both naked, and they were not ashamed" (Gn 2:25).
Tree of knowledge
3.
Immediately after these verses, chapter 3 begins with its account of
the first fall of the man and the woman, linked with the mysterious
tree already called the "tree of the knowledge of good and evil" (Gn
2:17). Thus an entirely new situation emerges, essentially different
from the preceding. The tree of knowledge of good and evil is the
line of demarcation between the two original situations which
Genesis speaks of.
The
first situation was that of original innocence, in which man (male
and female) was, as it were, outside the sphere of the knowledge of
good and evil, until the moment when he transgressed the Creator's
prohibition and ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge. The second
situation, however, was that in which man, after having disobeyed
the Creator's command at the prompting of the evil spirit,
symbolized by the serpent, found himself, in a certain way, within
the sphere of the knowledge of good and evil. This second situation
determined the state of human sinfulness, in contrast to the state
of primitive innocence.
Even
though the "Yahwist" text is very concise, it suffices with clarity
to differentiate and to set against each other those two original
situations. We speak here of situations, having before our eyes the
account which is a description of events. Nonetheless, by means of
this description and all its particulars, the essential difference
emerges between the state of man's sinfulness and that of his
original innocence.(3)
Systematic theology will discern in these two antithetical
situations two different states of human nature: the state of
integral nature and the state of fallen nature. All this emerges
from that "Yahwist" text of Genesis 2-3, which contains in itself
the most ancient word of revelation. Evidently it has a fundamental
significance for the theology of man and for the theology of the
body.
The "Yahwist"
text
4. When
Christ, referring to the "beginning," directed his questioners to
the words written in Genesis 2:24, he ordered them, in a certain
sense, to go beyond the boundary which, in the Yahwist text of
Genesis, runs between the first and second situation of man. He did
not approve what Moses had permitted "for their hardness of heart."
He appealed to the words of the first divine regulation, which in
this text is expressly linked to man's state of original innocence.
This means that this regulation has not lost its force, even though
man has lost his primitive innocence.
Christ's
reply is decisive and unequivocal. Therefore, we must draw from it
the normative conclusions which have an essential significance not
only for ethics, but especially for the theology of man and for the
theology of the body. As a particular element of theological
anthropology, it is constituted on the basis of the Word of God
which is revealed. During the next meeting we shall seek to draw
these conclusions.
Notes
1) If in
the language of the rationalism of the 19th century, the term "myth"
indicated what was not contained in reality, the product of the
imagination (Wundt), or what is irrational (Levy-Bruhl), the 20th
century has modified the concept of myth.
L. Walk sees in myth natural philosophy, primitive and religious. R.
Otto considers it as the instrument of religious knowledge. For C.
G. Jung, however, myth is the manifestation of the archetypes and
the expression of the "collective unconsciousness," the symbol of
the interior processes.
M. Eliade discovers in myth the structure of the reality that is
inaccessible to rational and empirical investigation. Myth
transforms the event into a category, and makes us capable of
perceiving the transcendental reality. It is not merely a symbol of
the interior processes (as Jung states), but it is an autonomous and
creative act of the human spirit by means of which revelation is
realized (cf. Traite d'histoire des religions [Paris: 1949], p. 363;
Images et symboles [Paris: 1952], pp. 199-235).
According to P. Tillich myth is a symbol, constituted by the
elements of reality to present the absolute and the transcendence of
being, to which the religious act tends.
H. Schlier emphasizes that the myth does not know historical facts
and has no need of them, inasmuch as it describes man's cosmic
destiny, which is always identical.In short, the myth tends to know
what is unknowable.
According to P. Ricoeur: "The myth is something other than an
explanation of the world, of its history and its destiny. It
expresses in terms of the world, indeed of what is beyond the world,
or of a second world, the understanding that man has of himself
through relation with the fundamental and the limit of his
existence.... It expresses in an objective language the
understanding that man has of his dependence in regard to what lies
at the limit and the origin of his world" (P. Ricoeur, Le conflit
des interprétation [Paris: Seuil, 1969], p. 383).
The Adamic myth is par excellence the anthropological myth. Adam
means Man. But not every myth of the 'primordial man' is an 'Adamic
myth' which...alone is truly anthropological. By this three features
are denoted:
—the aetiological myth relates the origin of evil to an ancestor of
present mankind, whose condition is homogeneous with ours....
—the aetiological myth is the most extreme attempt to separate the
origin of evil from that of good. The aim of this myth is to
establish firmly that evil has a radical origin, distinct from the
more primitive source of the goodness of things....
The myth, in naming Adam, man, makes explicit the concrete
universality of human evil; the spirit of penitence is given in the
Adamic myth the symbol of this universality. Thus we find
again...the universalizing function of the myth. But at the same
time, we find the two other functions, equally called forth by the
penitential experience.... The proto-historical myth thus serves not
only to make general to mankind of all times and of all places the
experience of Israel, but to extend to mankind the great tension of
the condemnation and of mercy which the prophets had taught Israel
to discern in its own destiny.
Finally, the last function of the myth, which finds a motive in the
faith of Israel: the myth prepares for speculation in exploring the
point where the ontological and the historical part company" (P.
Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité: Il Symbolique du mal [Paris:
Aubier, 1960], pp. 218-227).
2) As
regards etymology, it is not excluded that the Hebrew term ish is
derived from a root which signifies "strength" (ish or wsh), whereas
ishshah is linked to a series of Semitic terms whose meaning varies
between "woman" and "wife." The etymology proposed by the biblical
text is of a popular character and serves to underline the unity of
the origin of man and woman. This seems to be confirmed by the
assonance of both terms.
3)
"Religious language itself calls for the transposition from 'images'
or rather 'symbolic modalities' to 'conceptual modalities' of
expression. At first sight this transposition might appear to be a
purely extrinsic change. Symbolic language seems inadequate to
introduce the concept because of a reason that is peculiar to
Western culture. In this culture religious language has always been
conditioned by another language, the philosophical, which is the
conceptual language par excellence.... If it is true that a
religious vocabulary is understood only in a community which
interprets it and according to a tradition of interpretation, it is
also true that there does not exist a tradition of interpretation
that is not 'mediated' by some philosophical conception.
So the word 'God,' which in the biblical texts receives its meaning
from the convergence of different modes of discourse (narratives,
prophecies, legislative texts and wisdom literature, proverbs and
hymns)—viewing this convergence both as the point of intersection
and as the horizon evasive of any and every form—had to be absorbed
in the conceptual space, in order to be reinterpreted in terms of
the philosophical Absolute, as the first Mover, first Cause, Actus
Essendi, perfect Being, etc. Our concept of God pertains therefore,
to an onto-theology, in which there is organized the entire
constellation of the key-words of theological semantics, but in a
framework of meanings dictated by metaphysics" (P. Ricoeur,
Ermeneutica biblica [Brescia: Morcelliana, 1978], pp. 140-141;
original title, Biblical Hermeneutics [Montana: 1975]).
The question, whether the metaphysical reduction really expresses
the content which the symbolical and metaphorical language conceals
within itself, is another matter.
Taken
from: L'Osservatore Romano Weekly Edition in English 24 September
1979, page 1
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